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THE EMERGING DUAL FEDERAL ROLE FOR THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD: WARFIGHTING AND HOMELAND DEFENSE

BY

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines different aspects of the emerging Homeland Defense mission, specially the role of the Army National Guard (ARNG). First it provides an historical perspective on the ARNG's warfighting and homeland defense organization, roles, and missions. It argues that the emerging mission can be executed without having to convert a significant number of ARNG units to a sole homeland defense role. The missions performed by the Army National Guard in the past are similar to projected future missions. Such is important to the argument that the ARNG is capable of performing both warfighting and homeland defense missions.

This study describes the complexity of the emerging missions that would be associated with homeland defense. Finally, it argues that traditional warfighting roles should not be discarded. The study offers a solution for future planners. It concludes that the debate over the role of the ARNG in homeland defense would continue for some time to come. Hence, this study purports to contribute positively to on-going deliberations on the roles and missions of the ARNG.

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PREFACE

I would like to thank my adviser, Colonel James Pierce, United States Army, whose expertise and understanding of "The Army National Guard and Its Military Perspective" kept me focused and effectively on track. His patient guidance, insightful approach, recommendations, editorial guidance and perseverance in advising a culturally different student were absolutely fantastic. He managed to bring me back to the "reality of writing" time after time. I will always be indebted to him for his support and untiring guidance and mentoring.

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THE EMERGING DUAL FEDERAL ROLE FOR THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD: WARFIGHTING AND HOMELAND DEFENSE

I think as we look at the role that the Department of Defense plays in homeland security...The most obvious component of the Department of Defense force structure to have a role with domestic security is the National Guard. We will have to work with the Department of Defense and with the governors to identify what that role will be.¹

—Governor Tom Ridge Director of Homeland Security

Last year was extremely difficult for the United States. The heinous terrorist events of 11 September 2001 changed many things. Among them was the nation's perspective on Homeland Security. Live television images of Army National Guard soldiers patrolling our nation's borders, securing airports, guarding the Pentagon, supporting emergency first responders both in New York and Washington, D.C., and performing a myriad of other duties, revealed a different perspective of the military to the American people. Before the attacks, homeland security was a matter of little concern, but plenty of conjecture within the Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal agencies. Immediately thereafter, homeland security soared a new level of urgency. For the Army National Guard (or Army Guard), those events marked the beginning of a national debate echoed in Governor Ridge's observation above. The debate relates to the future roles and missions of Army National Guard units in "warfighting" and "homeland security" as they prepare for and fulfill their state and federal responsibilities. A dicey issue of the debate pertains to the potential influence on the Army National Guard's federal mission if some of its units are reorganized solely for homeland security, and not for warfighting.

Adding to the homeland security debate, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, released in January 2001, well before September 11, a report concerning security issues facing the nation in the future². Among its many recommendations, the commission proposed that the Secretary of Defense "make homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard." The terrorist acts of September 11 confirmed the report's findings and its prediction of an uncertain future for the United States and the Western world in the forthcoming years. The Commission predicted an act of terrorism using weapons of mass destruction within the United States sometime in the not-too-distant future.

This study reviews homeland defense missions as a natural and logical extension of the current Army National Guard warfighting capabilities. It examines the current and the yet-to-be-defined roles and missions for homeland defense. It then reviews the warfighting and homeland defense missions from an historical perspective. Finally, it offers a comparative analysis of the warfighting and projected future homeland defense missions. This analysis demonstrates the potential for the "dual-missioning" of existing Army National Guard divisional units for warfighting and homeland defense based on their current organizational and equipment configuration.

DEFINING HOMELAND DEFENSE

Never before have two somewhat different terms, homeland security and homeland defense, been used almost interchangeably throughout the published media. Examination of Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms" does not provide an official published definition or perspective on homeland security; neither does it provide a definition for homeland defense. Presently, the Department of Defense is attempting to develop a common use military definition for both terms. The Department of Defense seems to use homeland defense interchangeably with homeland security, as depicted in numerous publications such as the Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001 and others.

This lexical ambiguity is not unique to the military. The <u>Atlanta-Journal Constitution</u> in its 15 November 2001 article "In Defense of their Country" described how states like Georgia are dealing with the issue of homeland security. However, their description is firmly associated with the numerous missions being performed by Georgia's National Guardsmen across the entire state and the country. ⁴ These missions range from airport security, to patrols along the Mexico-United States border. The article goes on to describe how President Bush, while visiting Atlanta called for "Americans to join up in the homeland security effort". Since September 2001, many newspapers and military magazines have provided or formulated their own definition of homeland defense and its overarching concept of homeland security. The media portrayal of homeland security and homeland defense as being one and the same validate a common trend across the nation.

This study analyzes one of the proposed and another yet-to-be-developed definition of homeland security and homeland defense. Both of these conceptual constructs provide reference points from which the Army National Guard future roles and missions will emerge. This study further offers insight into the newly created roles and the mission perspectives of warfighting and homeland defense that Army National Guard units will be expected to perform in the dawning century.

THE EMERGING "NEW" MISSION

As noted, there is no official definition of homeland security or homeland defense. The closest to an official definition is found in a paper by Mr. Charles L. Cragin, Assistant Secretary of Defense. 5 He defines homeland defense as "the military role in the principal task of the U.S. Government to protect the United States, its territories, and citizens. It includes: deterring and defending against attack, supporting domestic authorities for crisis and consequence management in regard to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), protecting national security assets, such as installations and deploying forces, and helping to ensure availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of other critical assets."

An emerging definition for homeland defense was recently proffered by Ms K. Condon, former Assistant Secretary of the Army. She defined homeland defense as: "The protection of United States territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against attacks emanating from inside or outside the United States. Among the missions, it includes sovereignty defense of land, air, maritime, space and information, missile defense, threat reduction, deterrence, preemption of military attack and terrorism." ⁷

Since we have no other official definition, Mr. Cragin's definition will serve as the framework for the mission and task analysis conducted in the remainder of this study. Certainly these definitions are similar in nature, with only minor semantic differences. However, Cragin's definition cites selected tasks and roles that must be reviewed and understood in the context of homeland defense. Among them are: the Army and the National Guard's traditional role for Homeland Defense (HLD); HLD's position in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW); protection against unconventional threats, protection of critical and national security assets; supporting domestic authorities; protection of U.S. territory; missile defense; and threat reduction and deterrence.⁸

For a more traditional understanding of the military missions, the following paragraphs review these tasks and roles within the context of the U.S. government's role as protector of the American people. The projected missions and its characterizations are:

Traditional Army role in Homeland Defense: This traditional homeland
defense role has been the primary mission of U.S. land forces since the
colonial period. Homeland Defense was recently reestablished as the
first priority within the Department of Defense and a primary mission for
Army National Guard units. Homeland defense missions generally do not
include a direct combat role since it is assumed that the dominant military
status of the United States precludes any potential adversary from a

- direct force-on-force confrontation. The definition assumes that the military will mainly protect the U.S. homeland from potential unconventional threats.⁹
- Homeland Defense within Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW): These are typically nontraditional combat missions, such as support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, support to counter drug operations, and detecting and preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents in the U.S. homeland and its territories.¹⁰ Including some Homeland Defense missions under MOOTW seems reasonable based on the nature of missions. However, grouping homeland defense within MOOTW may be a temporary measure, since the Department of Defense has not released the results of its study on homeland defense.
- Protection against Unconventional Threats: These are threats that may come from within or outside of the nation.¹¹ Mainly, such threats posed by massive illegal immigration, drug problems, and organized terrorist groups. We must acknowledge that illegal immigration adversely affects our states and disrupts domestic labor by creating a pool of cheap, nonorganized, non-skilled workers. Moreover, this force is usually without protection for medical and disabling injuries. Illegal drugs strike at the very core of our society by robbing the nation of its youth. Also, it creates an enormous drain of manpower and resources on the law enforcement agencies trying to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the country. Perhaps the worst of all threats are terrorists groups, either domestic or foreign. Their activities are directed at inflicting fear and panic in the population, destabilizing local, state, or the national government.
- Protection of Critical and National Security Assets: Loss of such assets will have an adverse impact on the nation, its internal orderly functioning, or on the outcome of any war that the nation may be waging.¹² Protection of these assets is deemed to be so critical that commitment of the military, like the Army National Guard, is appropriate for a temporary period of time. To illustrate this, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 attacks, the President called upon Active and Guard Army units for protection of designated critical sites and transportation centers, like

- airports. Six months after the attacks, over 45,000 soldiers are still performing these duties across the nation.¹³
- Supporting Domestic Authorities: The U.S. Armed Forces, especially the land forces, have traditionally supported civil authorities in time of crisis, either manmade or natural. Usually known as Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, the main objective for the U.S. Army in this role is to provide essential support, services, assets, or specialized resources to enable civil authorities to deal with situations that require responses beyond their organic capabilities.¹⁴ An example was the military support given to New York City in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center.
- Protection of U.S. Territory: This term is used synonymously with homeland defense. The principal role of the U.S. Army is to be prepared to participate as an element of the joint forces executing plans for the defense of the United States and its territories.¹⁵ This mission is inherent to the Armed Forces. Army National Guard units have performed such missions throughout its history.
- Missile Defense: This capability is designed to protect the United States
 and its territories from land, sea, or space launched missiles. In the nearto-mid term, the role of the Army is to test, deploy, and operate a land
 based missile defense system. This capability, when fully fielded, will be
 integrated into the nation's Early Tactical Warning System.¹⁶
- Threat Reduction and Deterrence: This role is not precisely defined. It
 spans a broad spectrum of military operations, but relates primarily to
 land, sea, or space-launched. A set of activities designed to lessen the
 likelihood of attacks against the United States and its territories. Selected
 covert activities also fall into this category.

These missions demonstrate that homeland defense spans a plethora of activities and address a variety of potential scenarios. Before September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard had mainly performed a simple version of a homeland defense role. Consider the traditional ARNG mission: "Protecting our territory, population, and infrastructure at home by deterring, defending against, and mitigating...and helping to ensure availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of critical national assets.¹⁷

The Army National Guard must now prepare to perform the broad spectrum of the missions associated with projected post-9/11 homeland defense. This expectation is based on

the Guard's emerging role as the designated DoD element of the Army for homeland defense.¹⁸ Until a subsequent comparison of missions is completed, this study cannot precisely ascertain if Army National Guard units can perform homeland defense missions within its current war fighting configuration. However, the Army National Guard's ability to successfully perform such missions can be explored within a historical context.

HISTORICAL NATIONAL-WARFIGHT

COLONIAL

The history and traditions of the United States led to the creation of armed forces that were a true reflection of and an extension of the civilian society. Since the colonial era, citizen-soldiers have made significant contributions to the national defense and have served in every major conflict involving the United States. The Army National Guard (formerly called the Militia) was involved in homeland defense at the birth of the Republic. In the early days of the nation, "common defense" meant two simple tasks or missions: defeating a foreign invasion, and defending against local Indians. Military forces were raised to: first, protect settlements and settlers; second, protect England's colonial possessions; and subsequently, to sever the colonies from England. Later, the young nation raised additional military forces to protect its possessions and territory against England, France, and Spain. Over the course of the last 350 years, the nature of "common defense", or "homeland defense" and the military organizations involved have significantly evolved from its colonial origin to the construct described in the recent Hart-Rudman Commission report.

WORLD WAR I

Historically, Americans have been unwilling to finance a large standing army mostly out of concern for a military takeover. Throughout the nation's history, major conflicts have been fought by a small standing army augmented by the militia units. World War I (WWI) was not an exception. During WWI Army National Guard units were called to federal service to man coastal fortifications to repel any potential military invasion. During WWI, Army National Guard units were deployed and fought alongside Army regulars in the fields of Europe. During those early years of the 20th century, Army National Guard units were demonstrating their military value as competent warfighting organizations. ²¹

The organizational structures of Army National Guard warfighting units during World War I were developed along the "quadrangular division" construct. These units consisted of four major military elements, usually functional brigades with organic battalions and companies.

This functional organization persisted through World War I and into the early 1940s.²² Similar in nature to the Regular Army, Army National Guard units were organized along traditional military functions including: Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Military Police, Medical, Engineers, Signal, Finance, Ordnance, and Quartermaster specialties. Army Guard warfighting units were required to train in the same skills sets as the Regular Army. For instance, Infantry units trained in the use of bayonets, rifles, machine guns, assault, and other infantry related tactics. Therefore, the units' functions and tasks were commensurate with the expected roles in warfighting- combat, combat support, and combat service support missions.

Army National Guard units routinely prepared for war in times of peace. Normally, units drilled and trained monthly at home stations. Training was dedicated to exercising the skills directly related to the units' warfighting functions. Regular Army units trained in similar skills, but with a higher degree of frequency and intensity.²³ This disparity of training effectiveness has always been a concern for the national military leadership prior to the employment of Army National Guard units in combat. Recognizing the need to intensify the training tempo for Army Guard units, President Woodrow Wilson drafted the entire National Guard into federal service in 1916.

The federalization of Army National Guard units left the states for the first time without their principal means of responding to crisis, natural or manmade disasters, or the capability to support local authorities.²⁴ The states were left to fend for themselves; the state's governors were without "homeland defense." In retrospect, the federalization of Army National Guard units initiated the first major conflict between the states and the federal government concerning the federal mission of the Army Guard.

WORLD WAR II

The period between the end of World War I and the early 1940s, from a military perspective, was unremarkable. At the outset of World War II, the Army National Guard maintained a higher level of preparations and readiness than that experienced prior to World War I. Unlike the experiences of WWI, Army National Guard units had significantly trained for their warfighting or combat missions before being federalized. Before the attacks on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, Army units, both the Regular and National Guard soldiers were training for combat for several months before the Japanese attacks and the subsequent entry of the U.S. into World War II. The Army National Guard's organizational combat structure at the outset of World War II consisted of eighteen (18) combat divisions, and a variety of regiments and brigades. Similar to their WWI divisional predecessors, the units were functionally aligned

in Coastal Artillery, Cavalry, Infantry, Field Artillery, Medical, Military Police, Transportation, Quartermaster, Aerial Observation, and Harbor Defense units, among others.

Unlike the predominant organization of the Regular Army units, the Army Guard units had not completed a "triangulation" reorganization.²⁵ Triangulation the Army's warfighting divisions from four to three main combat brigade elements, as previously organized for World War I. Almost immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, the Army swelled its ranks with federalized Army National Guard units. And, similar to WWI, the Army National Guard and the Regular Army were deployed overseas to fight a far-away enemy. The newly reorganized divisions were at full manpower strength, well-trained, and prepared to accomplish their warfighting and combat missions.

Before deploying for World War II, Army National Guard units, like their counterparts in the Regular Army, continued to organize additional combat troops and to train for war, rather than merely providing dedicated troops to guard essential installations. While not a universal rule, this dual military mission approach had both utility and value-²⁶ Utility because it prepared units for potential future combat missions: and value in that it provided a greater stimulus and variety of training rather than merely training to perform guard duty at some critical site.

Unlike the previous war, WWII deployed Army National Guard units did not leave their states devoid of troops to support their internal security missions. The constabulary security-and-patrol mission within the states was assigned to the United States Guard, the state's militia units, not to be confused with Army National Guard units.²⁷ The U.S. Guard was a state organization raised to meet internal needs once Army Guard units deployed. These units were primarily volunteers who, for the most part, had participated in World War I.

To enhance the nation's security, the Army Chief of Staff authorized dedicating twenty-five Army National Guard combat military police battalions to complement the United States Guard in providing homeland defense across the nation.²⁸ This was perhaps the first major decision which recognized that a military "dual-mission" ARNG capability was necessary to provide internal security for the nation, while supporting the nation's warfighting efforts. The selected units were the fourth battalions of the newly reorganized "triangular" divisions. The military police units provided security for infrastructure determined to be essential for the war. These units also conducted area and route reconnaissance and protection of military convoys. However, as discussed earlier, the Army Chief of Staff wanted this arrangement of using combat military forces for infrastructure security, primarily guard duty, to be temporary in nature. He believed that that combat forces would cease to be effective warfighting assets if they were detained for extended periods performing infrastructure protection.

The same kind of military police units performed prisoner-of-war security, route and key area security, and other combat-related missions during the war, thus demonstrating the ability, capability, and the flexibility of combat units to perform "combat and other than combat" missions when required. ²⁹

PERSIAN GULF WAR- NOW

After the Korean conflict ended, the political climate in the United States mitigated against calling the Army National Guard to federal duty for the nation's undeclared wars, like Vietnam. The Persian Gulf War (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) marked the first time that Army National Guard units were called in significant numbers to federal duty since Korea. To provide an accurate depiction of the Army Guard's performance during the Desert Shield / Desert Storm conflict, two different perspectives will be explored. First, consider the Department of Defense perspective, which oversaw the ARNG's call-up to federal duty and subsequent deployment for the Gulf War. The DoD's after-action report shows that over 231,000 reservists from all services were called to active duty during the crisis. About half of the personnel saw duty in the Kuwait Theater of Operations. Over 50,000 of these reservists were members of different Army National Guard units. These units were organized similarly to the World War II "triangularized' divisions. Also, their military functionalities followed the same specialization rationale as the World War II construct.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relationships stipulates in its report that "what the Department of Defense accomplished in the resolution of the Persian Gulf crisis simply could not have been done without …reservists and National Guard personnel who served in combat, combat support, and combat service support and administration roles both in the theater and elsewhere."

Generally, the report on the Army National Guard unit's preparation for the warfight and potential combat was sound. However, it was not without controversy.³¹ Various authorities made either direct or indirect criticism of the Army Guard's role and performance in the Persian Gulf military activities. The General Accounting Office (GAO) was one of those organizations that assessed and reported on the Army Guard's unit performance. It concluded that the Army did not deploy the National Guard's "round-out" combat brigades with deploying Active Army divisions because of training and readiness deficiencies.

Secondly, from the Army National Guard's perspective, the Defense Department policy during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm was not as effective as portrayed by the various reports. Moreover, the National Guard Bureau gave both operations a cautious

interpretation of the experiences gained. It agreed with the GAO that round-out brigades needed more training before deployment for actual combat missions. However, the National Guard Bureau ascertained that Army Guard units were ready for federalization. It claimed that ninety-seven percent of those called to active duty were ready and trained for their warfighting duties. Therefore, in agreement with the Department of Defense findings, the National Guard Bureau concluded that the ARNG successful contributed to Desert Shield and Desert Storm.³²

These contemporary deployments offer good evidence of the on-going reliance of the Department of Defense on Army National Guard units to meet their worldwide warfighting commitments. Further, the on-going deployments and utilization of the Army National Guard to support smaller scale contingencies is a warfighting complementary role that supports the federal mission.³³ Incremental assignments of operational combat missions to the Army National Guard have increased over the course of the last ten years. Moreover, such operational commitments are not projected to diminish in the near future.

The most significant difference from previous wars is in homeland defense. Because recent wars have not threatened United States territory or its citizens, Army National Guard units have not been required to perform any kind of security mission within the nation's internal infrastructure and borders.

21ST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE

The United States mobilized Army National Guard units to meet its war fighting requirements for the two World Wars, the Korean War, the Berlin Crisis, Vietnam, and most recently the Persian Gulf conflict. Structurally organized along the same functional capabilities as the Active Army, Army National Guard units continuously train primarily to meet their federal warfighting responsibilities. Within the Army National Guard, military units are organized into eight (8) combat divisions; ten (10) separate infantry brigades, fifteen (15) enhanced separate brigades, and a host of combat support and combat service support groups, brigades and separate battalions. Almost identical to the U.S. Army World War II structure, present Army National Guard units are expected to perform military missions commensurate with their functional specialties. Today's functional specialties consist of: Infantry, Armor, Mechanized Infantry, Artillery, Medical, Military Police, Aviation, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Transportation, Special Forces, and others. Current warfighting structure also includes a myriad of small unit elements complementing combat service and combat service support for full mission capability of the U.S. Army.

Army National Guard units are core elements of the nation's military capacity and its units comprise over forty percent (40%) of the U.S. Army combat power, and greater than thirty five percent (35%) of combat support and service support capabilities. Most of the Army National Guard units are assigned to a given warfighting Combatant Commander-in-Chief (CINC) area of responsibility. Army Guard units are expected to deploy anywhere in the world to accomplish their wartime missions. This capability was tested and effectively demonstrated in the recent selected call-up of Army Guard units to federal duty for Task Force Eagle. In support of the federal mission, the Army National Guard deployed division task forces to support peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.³⁶ Major General Steven H. Blum, Commanding General 29th Division (Light), judged "the Army National Guard is performing magnificently. Our citizen-soldiers have once again demonstrated their unique capability to train for war, and perform non-combat missions, like peace-keeping operations." For the Army National Guard, the confidence demonstrated by the U.S. Army appears to explicitly recognize the warfighting and combat roles of its units.

WARFIGHTING-21ST CENTURY

Continuous calls to active federal service provide irrefutable evidence of the Army's dependence on the Army National Guard as an element of U.S. land power. However, the warfighting role of the Army National Guard divisional units is not a forgone conclusion. The former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Reimer, and the Reserve Components Study Group expressed concern over the lack of integration of Guard divisions in the Department of Defense deliberate war plans. Presently, only six of the eight Army Guard divisions are included in joint war plans, as briefed by the Chief, Force Structure Division, National Guard Bureau, to Mr. White, Secretary of the Army, in November 2001.³⁷ Therefore, with the understanding that two divisions are not-yet-missioned, it is safe to assume that the Hart-Rudman Commission's recommendations for conversion to homeland defense refer to the non-missioned divisional units.

Yet from a different perspective, the potential "new role" does not restrict the divisional units from becoming candidates for a dual-mission- for warfighting and homeland defense.

This review of the Army National Guard's warfighting missions from an historical and functional perspective has reviewed ARNG's roles and performance in two world wars and recent military crises. In addition, this historical review has assessed the role, organization, and missions peculiar to Army National Guard units both during peace as well as during the transition to war.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE-HOMELAND DEFENSE

Separating homeland defense and warfighting functions within military units is essentially impossible. Indeed U.S. citizens have traditionally seen homeland defense as a mission performed within the nation's borders.³⁸ This tradition dates to the early days of the 20th Century. The foregoing historical review provides a basis for a comparative analysis of those missions performed both in warfighting and for homeland defense will be constructed. First, we should review the emerging roles and missions associated with homeland defense. Then we will consider the implications of transforming selected Guard combat units to a "yet-to-bedetermined" homeland defense organizational construct.

COLONIAL

Homeland defense during the early colonial period focused on the simple purpose of defending the colonial settlements.

WORLD WAR I

During World War I, most military combat units deployed immediately after completion of their warfighting training to overseas theaters. However, selected Army National Guard units were retrained to guard essential infrastructure within the continental United States and its territories. Non-deployed units were assigned to guard "certain railroad bridges and tunnels, the destruction of which could cause prolonged delays in the service between important centers and the guarding of which cannot with safety be performed by civilian watchmen." Foremost was the protection of locations and infrastructure identified as vital national assets, whose destruction would seriously jeopardize the war effort. Notice the importance of the qualifier for these missions: They were to safeguard vital national assets. Protection of essential infrastructure was true a non-combat task given to military units.

Identification of vital national assets is of great concern to the U.S. military, since protection of these assets requires commitment of military forces. In addition, the protection of vital national assets has a secondary effect. The use of combat troops for asset protection limits the availability of manpower for other military duties, particularly the war effort. Therefore, in World War I military missions for homeland defense were seen as a tax against the capabilities of the warfighting forces. It is useful to remember that Army National Guard units, like all U.S. forces, are trained for warfighting. But hardly seldom were they trained for constabulary or security duties.

WORLD WAR II

For almost one and a half years before entering into World War II, the United States Armed Forces had been preparing for war. Its land forces, the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve units were reorganized for combat, intensively trained, and equipped for the forthcoming war effort. Immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, thousands of federalized Army National Guard soldiers were siphoned away to provide defense at hundreds of factories, bridges, dams, railroads, and beaches. There was genuine expectation of an imminent attack on the North American soil. Fortunately, such an attack did not happen. However, according to estimates of the United States War Department, more than 60,000 men were engaged just one week after Pearl Harbor in some kind of guard duty or homeland defense mission. Significantly, it seemed at the time as if all installations, regardless of type or location, were considered vital and in need of protection. Therefore, every plant, government building, or public use facility was perceived as being essential or critical. For the most part, essential infrastructure or vital national assets remained unidentified. Consequently, every state was free to determine what constituted a vital asset.

To deal with the extraordinary surge of protection requirements, the War Department assigned the mission to Army Guard divisions. The new protection mission was given to the fourth regiment of the yet to be "triangularized" Guard divisions. Similar to responses to other major crisis, the post-Pearl Harbor attacks spawned a myriad of military activities. Mostly, these activities were designed to show the public that the United States society remained organized and its institutions and defense were in place and effectively working. Soldiers patrolling the streets, guarding industrial installations and vulnerable sites, as well as protecting power plants and water supplies across the nation provided nothing more than to provide a calming effect. But, they did not shorten the conflict. However, similar to WWI, the level of effort was temporary; it could not be effectively sustained for a long period.

Another noticeable difference from the World War I era was that the majority of the states had organized and trained state's guard units to perform guard duty or homeland defense missions. The adverse experiences of the various states after the Army National Guard was federalized and deployed for WWI alerted them to the need for self-protection after the ARNG units were called up. In times of war, the states concluded that the state's defense and the nation's defense are inseparable. This point was summarily driven home in the Annual Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs to the U.S. Congress in 1913. The report stated: "Local or state pride is a large factor in securing efficiency, . . . but beyond this there is a national vista, and this is too frequently lost sight of. The fate of the State is irrevocably

wrapped up in that of the Nation. Organized Militia are not made for State purposes, but are made for National purposes—to so create, foster, and develop . . . citizen soldiery forming an effective adjunct in the defense of the Nation."⁴⁶

The World War II Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, like his predecessor in World War I, recognized that the main purpose of U.S. land forces was to fight and defeat the nation's enemies. He understood that the role of the Army National Guard and the Army was to provide temporary support for protection of the nation's civilian installations and factories⁴⁷. Furthermore, General Marshall believed that permanent guard duty was not the role of soldiers, regardless of their status. Interestingly enough, his reasoning rested on a simple military principle: An army scattered throughout the nation in numerous detachments ceases to be an army at all. This argument is at the root of the current debate pertaining to the roles and missions for the Army National Guard divisional structure in the future.⁴⁸

PERSIAN GULF WAR-NOW

The federal mission of the Army National Guard is to maintain ready, deployable, well equipped and trained units to augment the active forces for war, or for any natural or manmade emergency. Army National Guard units are located across the nation in approximately 3,200 communities in all 50 states, three territories and the District of Columbia. Numbering well over 350,000 soldiers, Army Guard units are organized in warfighting organizations similar to the Active Army. The contemporary force structure of the Army National Guard encompasses a mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. These units have undergone a series of changes and evolutions over the last twelve to fifteen years.

In peacetime, Army Guard units maintain a warfighting federal role, along with homeland defense or state role. This dual role is better described as a "dual mission capability." To appreciate this capability we can look at the September 2001 deployment of the 29th Infantry division, composed of soldiers from Maryland, Virginia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, to Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of Stability Forces Ten (SFOR-10). Almost simultaneously, a battalion of the 29th, the 115th Infantry, deployed to Fort Stewart, Georgia in support of installation's post September 11th security implementation procedures.

21ST CENTURY

The National Security Study Group, more commonly called the Hart-Rudman Commission, argues that "the United States needs five kinds of military capabilities: nuclear capabilities to deter and protect the United States and its allies from attack; homeland security

capabilities; conventional capabilities necessary to win major wars; rapidly employable expeditionary capabilities; and humanitarian relief and constabulary capabilities."⁵¹

From a military perspective, this range of mission and capabilities seems straightforward. Several military reviews, like the <u>Association of the United States Army Magazine</u> and <u>Military Review</u> agree with this assessment of capabilities recommended for the U.S. forces in the near and long term future. The National Security Study Group does not prioritize these capabilities, seeming to regard them as equally critical. However, throughout the report homeland security consistently emerges as the Commission's first priority. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) 2001 provides nearly similar recommendations. The QDR establishes the following strategic tenets as the essence of a viable U.S. defense strategy: managing risks; a capabilities-based approach; defending the United States and projecting U.S. military power; strengthening alliances and partnerships; maintaining favorable regional balances, developing a broad portfolio of military capabilities; transforming defense. ⁵²

The Director of the Army National Guard, Lieutenant General Roger Schultz, in an interview with <u>Army Times</u> stated that the Guard had agreed to shoulder a new mission - homeland defense. ⁵³ It must be noted that this interview took place in April 1999, well before homeland defense was thrust to the forefront of our nation's political agenda. He was further quoted as saying, "Our (the Army Guard's) greatest challenge is trying to craft a workable definition of it (homeland defense)." Like other Army Guard leaders, he firmly believes in an organizational construct for dual missioned units- that is, units organized and trained for both warfighting and homeland defense. Army Guard leaders readily acknowledge that units missioned for warfighting and homeland defense cannot sustain either mission for an extended period. They concur that the nation's internal homeland security missions, can not be openended- that is, they can not be sustained indefinitely. This qualification is critical in planning for uses of the ARNG in homeland defense.

WARFIGHTING

The warfighting structure, roles, and missions for the Army National Guard are derived from the guidance found in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) September 30, 2001. As previously indicated, the QDR report is an element of the Department of Defense strategic planning system and drives the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS has not been updated since 1997. Nevertheless, the QDR does provide the projected future missions for the U.S. Armed Forces. Specifically, for the Army National Guard it allocates eight (8) warfighting divisions for the near future, fifteen (15) Enhanced Brigades as additional combat

forces, and it includes other non-combat forces to support the warfight. Final allocation of the forces is expected through the Total Army Analysis for years 09 and beyond. It is noteworthy that there are no forces dedicated to meet missions other than those related to warfighting. Therefore, no force structure is allocated to homeland security or homeland defense.⁵⁵

Deployments of Army Guard forces for future operational requirements will continue at the current high operational tempo. The experiences from the recent deployment of units to support missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Southwest Asia, and to other regions of the world confirms the original projection of greater reliance on the Army National Guard for the near future. Last year alone, more than 5,000 man-years were dedicated to support the Army National Guard's federal responsibilities across the globe. ⁵⁶

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Since September 11, 2001, Army Guard units continue to serve in combat and non-combat roles around the United States and other areas of the world. The post-9/11 presidential call-up of more than 45,000 Guard soldiers opened a serious debate on the use of military forces. Similar to previous times of national crisis, Army Guard units were committed by the U.S. Governors to provide security around a myriad of important locations like the U.S. borders, nuclear power plants, major airports, and other major installations within the United States and its territories.⁵⁷ Thus the unsettled debate with respect to the use of military warfighting units to perform roles as homeland defenders and security providers, returned to the forefront.

The utilization and employment of Army National Guard units for homeland defense missions while they are also apportioned for the warfight continues to be a contentious issue. The issue of requirement versus capability for units trained for warfighting, but deployed to support homeland security operations, persists. To illustrate the issue, the majority of the units recently federalized for homeland defense are Infantry, Combat Military Police, Aviation, Medical, and Transportation. These units may also be committed to the war against terrorists any place in the world. Therefore, the capabilities of the current Army National Guard force structure to simultaneously support warfighting and homeland defense missions must be accurately ascertained.⁵⁸

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS

Neither the Hart-Rudman Commission nor the Director of Homeland Security have promulgated any specific organizational construct, or mission parameters, for conduct of homeland defense.⁵⁹ In view of this uncertainty, it is paramount to explore the emerging role for

Army Guard divisional units from two distinct perspectives: the National Security Study Group (NSSG) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 respectively. Both provide useful insights into the warfighting and homeland defense roles for the U.S. military. Furthermore, the QDR offers authoritative guidance for the development of the National Military Strategy, which will guide the future composition of forces, capabilities, and the military expectations for the near and long term future. The Department of Defense is building its future force structure to meet the tenets of a capability-based force, with "defense of the United States" as its premier mission priority. The Department of Defense also recognized that U.S. forces must remain highly trained and ready to undertake major combat operations globally. Furthermore, these forces must be capable of defending the homeland, with significant reliance on the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve for the accomplishment of their military objective. ⁶⁰ Notwithstanding, any significant changes to any of the components could have an adverse impact not only on the military strategy, but also on the overall capability to execute it.

MISSIONS IN CONFLICT

There is a degree of uncertainty within the military community concerning the potential conflict between combat and homeland defense missions capabilities. Many analysts believe that most of the units that would be used for homeland defense would come from Army National Guard divisional general-purpose forces. Major General (Retired) Gerald T. Sajer, former Adjutant General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in his monograph entitled Homeland Security: A Strategy for the States, argues that: "...the same Guard units that have answered the call for help from their local communities, are the same Guard units that have marched off to all corners of the earth to fight the nation's wars." He expands his argument by stating, "the dual mission of service to nation and state is the heritage of the Guard."

The potential missions enunciated by Mr. Charles L. Craigan(see Figure 1 below) depict the traditional warfighting missions assigned to the Army Guard, and the "homeland defense missions tasked to them, as well as "projected" homeland defense missions.⁶²

MISSIONS	PAST	PRESENT	FUTURE
WARFIGHTING	X	X	X
MOOTW	X	X	X
HOMELAND DEFENSE	X	X	X
Protect Against Threats	X	X	X
Protect Critical Assets	X	X	X

Support Domestic Authorities	X	X	Х
Protect U.S. Territory	X	X	X
Missile Defense			?

FIGURE 1 ARMY GUARD MISSIONS - TIME ILLUSTRATION

Fig. 1 shows that Army National Guard units have performed assigned warfighting and homeland defense missions over the course of their history.

Significantly, the warfighting units demonstrated the capability to perform other non-warfighting missions without restructuring, and with an absolute minimum of training. General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff United States Army, believes that "units must be trained for the warfight. It takes only a few days or weeks to train a unit for homeland defense. It will take years to train a unit for war." Modern specialized tasks, such as the detection of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials, were not addressed in the illustrated mission profile. To execute those homeland defense tasks, several highly technical detachments were fielded over the past year, all of which are organic to the National Guard.

FUTURE MISSION PROFILE

To offer a complementary but different perspective toward the kinds of missions that Army National Guard units have performed and would be tasked, a limited review of warfighting and homeland defense missions is necessary. The missions will be divided along the traditional construct of Peace Operations, Limited Conflicts, and Major Theater Wars.⁶⁵

Peace Operations are characterized as Peace Building/Making, Military to Military Contacts, Arms Control, Nation Assistance, Peacekeeping, Security Assistance, Humanitarian Assistance, and Support to Domestic Authorities. Army National Guard units routinely perform Peace Operations within their states and abroad. Over the past 15-20 years, Army Guard units have engaged in such nation-building activities, as Fuerte Caminos in Central America, and military to military "partnership for peace" operations across the globe. Indeed, the ARNG has a well-deserved legacy of disaster relief and humanitarian missions, at home and abroad.

Limited Conflicts are characterized as counter-terrorism, raids, strikes, insurgency and counterinsurgency, peace enforcement, missile defense and counter drug-operations. ⁶⁸ Among these missions, the Army Guard has the lead for continental U.S. counter-drug operations. The ARNG's success in these operations has been documented in yearly reports to the U.S. Congress. Active Duty units are best prepared for limited conflicts, with the aforementioned exception. Typically, these missions are conducted far from our nation and usually for extended periods of deployment, such as Operation Just Cause in Panama, peace enforcement in

Kosovo, peace keeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina, counter-drug operations in South America, border patrols against terrorists and illegal aliens within Continental U.S. and numerous internal counter- drug operations.

Major Theater Wars (MTW) are characterized mostly as regional, nuclear, and global.⁶⁹ Army Guard units have fought side-by-side with the Active Component in every conflict and foreign war over the course of the nation's history. All historical documents, from the reports of Chief, National Guard Bureau, to the U.S. Congress, the Hart-Rudman Commission, to the most recent Roles and Missions for the Reserve Components, point to the traditional warfighting missions of the Army National Guard.

Army Guard units are expected to deploy and fight as an integral member of the Army's team. Figure 1 above, shows that over time the missions performed by the ARNG and projected are almost similar. Therefore, the roles and missions of the Army National Guard are not expected to change significantly in the future.

OPTIONS

Once homeland defense mission(s) are identified, developed, and approved, a broader set of options applicable to Army National Guard units should be explored. Meanwhile, three options should be considered to address the recommendations of the Hart-Rudman Commission.⁷¹

Option 1: Continue to field Army National Guard units for their traditional warfighting roles.⁷² These units will not train for homeland defense. As in the past, Army National Guard soldiers would be called to support any crisis, including acts of WMD attacks. Homeland defense would be incidental to their traditional warfight roles.

Option 2: Dual-Mission selected late-deploying units for warfighting and homeland defense capabilities.⁷³ These units will be equipped for the warfight as well as for homeland defense. Training will be for early deployment capability in support of any threat to the homeland and for consequence management.

Option 3: Convert selected units such as low priority, hard-to-fill-to strength units requiring specialized capabilities to the homeland defense role.⁷⁴ These units will be trained, equipped, and missioned uniquely for those mission-sets in need of state-of-art equipment and training for homeland defense.

MISSIONS SUMMARY-RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has demonstrated that yesterday's and today's warfighting and homeland defense roles have changed little over time. The past 100 years has shown that our land forces have successfully performed warfighting missions. Among these were the overwhelming victory in WWII, and most recently the Gulf War victory in the early 90s. These successes were made possible primarily by the ability of the U.S. Army and its Reserve Components, including the Army National Guard, to learn from past experiences, mistakes, and outright failures. Therefore, our understanding of the past is crucial to the projection of the Army National Guard's capability to serve as dual-mission selected forces.

The U.S. homeland is vulnerable to real and potential threats. The Director of Homeland Security, Governor Tom Ridge, has recommended changes for selected Army National Guard units to address these threats. Likewise, the Hart-Rudman Commission also recommended changes to Army Guard combat divisional units. Moreover, the Commission recommended conversion of selected divisional units strictly for homeland defense. However, no one has yet defined or quantified the impact that the proposed changes would have on the warfighting and sustainment capabilities that the Army National Guard brings to the U.S. Army.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This study recommends a solution that incorporates a combination of the aforementioned three options. Recognizing that there are no one-size-fits-all solutions, this recommendation includes a review with an explanation for each of the potential options:

First, units required for and expected to be early deployers for SSC, MTW or any warfighting contingency should be organized and trained within the traditional warfighting parameters outlined for Option 1, above. These units will be available on a limited basis to provide state's mission support and homeland defense. It is significant to note that their availability will be constrained by their federal warfighting role.

Second, option 2, above, equipping and training late deploying units with a dual mission capability presents unique challenges, most importantly cost.

The cost of the equipment required to accomplish both missions is projected to be significant, especially for procurement and fielding of state-of-the-art technology for the highly specialized missions like missile defense. In addition, training and sustainment for the capabilities required for both missions may become a significant constraint. Competition among the missions for resources, time, etc. may also become a detractor. However, such issues may be resolved under selected circumstances and may require a unique force structure.

Finally, converting only selected hard-to-sustain Army Guard units for the dual mission, Option 3, above offers a potential solution to the dilemma previously outlined. In principle, this option provides a desirable solution. It would address a given capability for homeland defense, without impacting the Army National Guard's warfighting construct. However, this solution requires a significant infusion of full-time manning to maintain proficiency in designated homeland defense skills—to provide the capabilities on short notice. Combining all three options, while converting selected special category units offers a solution that would satisfy the need for dedicated homeland defense units. Therefore, this study recommends a combination of these options, with Option 3 as a preferred choice.

Additionally, specialized homeland defense units could be a force structure in addition to the current force, if the requirements support it.

CONCLUSION

Our nation has been in a state-of-war since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Homeland defense is now at the forefront of our national security efforts. Its importance to the well-being and survivability of our nation cannot be over- emphasized. Neither can potential solutions to the homeland defense dilemma be overshadowed by other conflicting national priorities. The critical role of the Army National Guard, both as a federal and state force, is undeniable. Army Guard units possess capabilities that are unique and are partially derived from their "citizen-soldier" heritage. As an emerging mission, Homeland Defense is a natural and logical extension of the present capabilities of the Army National Guard.

This study advocates a major role for the Army National Guard in both warfighting and homeland defense. It argues that the emerging mission can be executed without having to convert a significant number of units to an exclusive homeland defense role. Moreover, recent events have shown that Army Guard units can perform homeland defense missions during times of crisis, such as terrorist attacks. However, previous experience also shows that there is a limit to the duration of the homeland defense mission before the wartime capability is negatively influenced.

Finally, this study identified a solution to address the complexity of the missions that would be associated with homeland defense. The nature of the prevailing risks to our nation's security may dictate a force capability not yet envisioned. Even so, Army Guard units provide unique military forces that should be at the "tip of the spear" in constructing homeland defense. Despite these emerging issues and challenges, traditional warfighting roles should not be discarded. The current Army National Guard warfighting construct should be retained, while only selected

hard-to-sustain Army Guard units would be designated for specific homeland defense missions. Assuredly, the debate over homeland security will continue for some time to come.

WORD COUNT = 8,361

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